A Musing Environment

The American Wind Energy Association lists a number of advantages to offshore wind, including harder wind, steadier winds, and because bigger turbines can be placed. In densely populated Europe, with its large shallow offshore sites, it looks even more attractive. This is less the case in the US, where strong winds blow in land areas that are not densely populated, and shallow seas away from shipping lanes are not as available.

The EU goal is 4% of its electricity from sea-based wind by 2020, but there are problems. The increase in materials cost, a shortage of ships to service the windmills (vessels and workers were thought to become available as North Sea oil and gas fields became depleted, but instead moved to other parts of the world), shortages of cables to connect windmills to the grid, and general concerns about cost and reliability. From Bloomberg:

“It’s been more difficult to build offshore projects than everyone thought,” said Goeran Lundgren, head of Nordic power generation at Stockholm-based Vattenfall AB, which has put a 640- megawatt wind farm in the Baltic Sea on hold. “I don’t think we’ll see any large-scale offshore parks until we’ve taken a few big development steps.”

5 MW wind turbinein the North Sea
Rotor blade diameter is 126 m (415 feet). The blades rotate for wind speeds between 7 and 70 mph, with maximum power produced at 30 mph. The expectation was that they would run 96% of the time, and at maximum power 38% of the time.

Discouraged companies include Shell and the German E.ON, Germany’s biggest utility and experienced in wind power. The two major suppliers of offshore wind, Vestas from Denmark and General Electric from the US, are focusing on more profitable onshore wind.

Atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide increased by 2.4 parts per million (doesn’t sound like much, does it) last year.

NOAA CO2 graph

The rate of increase in carbon dioxide concentrations accelerated over recent decades along with fossil fuel emissions. Since 2000, annual increases of two ppm or more have been common, compared with 1.5 ppm per year in the 1980s and less than one ppm per year during the 1960s.

Atmospheric methane, which had been stable for a few years, has also begun to increase.

NOAA methane graph

Methane levels rose last year for the first time since 1998. Methane is 25 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, but there’s far less of it in the atmosphere—about 1,800 parts per billion. When related climate affects are taken into account, methane’s overall climate impact is nearly half that of carbon dioxide.

Rapidly growing industrialization in Asia and rising wetland emissions in the Arctic and tropics are the most likely causes of the recent methane increase, said scientist Ed Dlugokencky from NOAA’s Earth System Research Laboratory.

Meanwhile, China and India are building coal plants like there is no tomorrow, and now European anti-nuclear power countries, Germany and Italy, are as well.

Over the next five years, Italy will increase its reliance on coal to 33 percent from 14 percent. Power generated by Enel [Italy’s major electricity producer] from coal will rise to 50 percent.

And Italy is not alone in its return to coal. Driven by rising demand, record high oil and natural gas prices, concerns over energy security and an aversion to nuclear energy, European countries are expected to put into operation about 50 coal-fired plants over the next five years, plants that will be in use for the next five decades.

Enel is buying into French nuclear power plants. And Italy plans to build new nuclear in-country, as laws there are changing. But both Germany and Italy appear to have gotten themselves (and the rest of us) in a GHG hole with their policies.

Back in the US: the Des Moines Register is covering a substantial range of viewpoints on a proposed coal plant. The only options being discussed are a mix of efficiency and wind, or that plus the new coal power plant.

A recent article (subscription needed) in Science lists new technologies that may decrease costs or/and increase efficiency.

In the past few years, [chemist David] Ginger [of the University of Washington, Seattle] and others point out, solar researchers have hit upon several potential breakthrough technologies but have been stymied at turning that potential into solar cells able to beat out silicon. “The next couple of years will be important to see if we can overcome those hurdles,” Ginger says. Although most of these novel cells are not yet close to commercialization, even one or two successes could dramatically change the landscape of worldwide energy production.

Light hitting today’s photovoltaic cell creates current if there is enough energy to excite the electrons. Efficiency is about 15 – 20% in commercial cells. The rest of light hitting the PV cell becomes waste heat. The theoretical limit of this kind of technology is 31%.

Increasing efficiency

Colors vary with size of quantum dots

The quantum world is different. Varying the size of quantum dots (crystals of a few hundred or thousand atoms) changes the colors absorbed or emitted. Theoretical efficiency may be as high as 44%, or even more with concentrated sunlight, but the details are difficult: efficiency today is only 2.5%, up from 1.6%.

To learn more:
• Nozik and Hanna,
• Los Alamos,
• Livermore,
or just search on quantum dot.

Cheaper technologies
Organic molecules, such as plastics, are cheaper to manufacture, but they respond to a smaller part of the spectrum, and waste most of the light. Add some metal nanoparticles, and there is surface plasmon resonance: light causes the nanoparticle to act like an antenna, capturing and channeling more of the light.

The good news is that the use of silver nanoparticles increases efficiency 40%; the bad news is that it is still less than 1%. Still, Ginger calls such a large increase “very promising.”

Another approach to organic solar cells is to increase the surface areas between the layers by shifting from one layer on top of another to layers that interpenetrate: bulk heterojunction. Alan Heeger of the University of California feels they may be ready for the market by 2010.

Other research strategies are being pursued.

For now, there appears to be no shortage of ideas about creating new high-efficiency, low-cost cells. But whether any of these ideas will have what it takes to beat silicon and revolutionize the solar business remains the field’s biggest unknown. “There are a lot of ways to beat the Shockley limit [31% efficiency limit] on paper, but it’s difficult to realize in the real world,” Nozik says. So far, it’s not for want of trying.

Subsidizing today’s technology
Severin Borenstein, director of University of California Energy Institute, has recently analyzed The Market Value and Cost of Solar Photovoltaic Electricity Production (go here for his talk and to download the analysis).

Borenstein looks at the cost of PV, including considerations re time of day and location. In the near term, the cost/ton greenhouse reductions people (legislators and others) are willing to pay will be less than $20, and it will be a while before they are go above $100/ton, in part because most renewables become good choices at less than that cost. The real cost of today’s technology, no matter what reasonable assumptions are made about the real cost of money or the yearly increase in electricity rates, exceeds $100/ton. Research into better PV looks like a much better use of the yearly $300 million California subsidy of installing solar cells.

Someone asked me to look at his piece on how to tackle climate change without nuclear power, using only 8 wedges. Solving climate change is relatively easy–an underlying assumption of anyone who believes it can be done with only a portion of today’s technology. Policy reports, on the other hand, emphasize the need for applying today’s technology today and increasing energy research by a factor of 3-4 times so that we can apply new technologies tomorrow.

image credit

I’ve seen this optimism often, from the Sierra Club and other environmental groups.

I updated my own calculation for how many wedges are needed. I used a more realistic rate of increase than do Pacala and Socolow, and reduced carbon dioxide emissions 80% by 2058 rather than keeping them the same. These assumptions lead to a need for 18 wedges. If you are good at math, please check! Reductions for all greenhouse gases, not just carbon dioxide, require even more wedges.

How easy will this be? I went to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group 3, and the reference case from the World Energy Outlook 2004 (International Energy Association). These do not use the term wedge, nor do they look at 50 year chunks of time. How do these reports reduce greenhouse gases enough to keep the world below the 2 C temperature increase many climatologists see as too much?

image credit

They don’t.

IPCC WG3 summarizes 177 analyses. Of those I’ve seen, most give a small number of examples, say a reference and mitigation scenario. Of these 177 mitigation scenarios, 118 reduce GHG emissions enough to keep temperature increase to 3.2-4 C. Only 6 try to find ways to keep the increase at 2 – 2.4 C. None look at even lower caps.

Business as usual (BAU) GHG assumptions are worse than when the studies were done, the world has not acted enough for even more years, so one would expect to find plans for adequate mitigation even more difficult to create today.

There may be post-IPCC analysis on how to keep total GHG emissions low enough to keep temperature increase below 2 C, but I have not seen it.

BAU assumptions assume expanded use of nuclear power, with increases in Asia and elsewhere. I doubt that any of the reports IPCC based its work on produced a mitigation scenario that did not depend on even more nuclear power. Yet none of these reports found sufficient reductions.

Those who communicate that we can do it without nuclear power do more than oppose the largest source of low-GHG electricity that can be added most rapidly today. They tell their listeners that addressing climate change is easy.

If we could agree on the solutions from the policy community, we could move on to the even harder task of cutting GHG emissions even more rapidly and radically. We need to find ways to do more, not argue that we can get by with less.

I took Greyhound to Tempe in late December, then friends and I visited south of the Arizona border, the state of Sonora and various people, for several days, including the new year. It was good to see the desert, good to meet new and interesting people. We joined a large family party including a dinner at midnight to greet the new year; it was wonderful and I hope to help with a similar new year’s greeting in 10 months.

I open my eyes more when traveling, attending to details I might ignore at home. In Mexico, I was struck not just by the rickety conditions of many of the houses, but by the size–many of the houses are smaller than my kitchen/dining area.

Image from another area of Mexico

Interestingly, Sonora is one of the more affluent areas in Mexico.

Habitat for Humanity
The Spanish language Habitat for Humanity has more information.

The new Habitat houses are 42 – 49 m2 (450 – 525 ft2) in rural areas, 60 m2 (645 sq ft) in cities. The cost to the family is $74/month for 7 years.

From Lighting the Way, from the InterAcademy Council:

Meeting the basic energy needs of the poorest people on this planet is a moral and social imperative that can and must be pursued in concert with sustainability objectives.…Place priority on achieving much greater access of the world’s poor to clean, affordable, high-quality fuels and electricity. The challenge of expanding access to modern forms of energy revolves primarily around issues of social equity and distribution—the fundamental problem is not one of inadequate global resources, unacceptable environmental damage, or unavailable technologies. Addressing the basic energy needs of the world’s poor is clearly central to the larger goal of sustainable development and must be a top priority for the international community if some dent is to be made in reducing current inequities.

Solar panels and dust

Solar Mexico subsidizes photovoltaic panels in Mexico, but some Mexicans in rural areas are buying PVs themselves.

These are needed to pump water and are a more reliable source of electricity than the city utility. Yet dust can reduce the effectiveness, as this NASA picture shows of the Mars Rover:

Rover’s dusty panels improve when the wind blows them clean. In parts of Mexico, the wind makes PVs dustier, and users might benefit from placing PV’s where they can be cleaned.

BAU trajectory. Renewables is primarily hydro; I’m guessing the tiny increase in renewables represents an enormous percentage increase in wind and solar.

According to the NY Times, FutureGen is kaput:

The Energy Department said it would pay for the gas-capturing technology, but industry would have to build and pay for the commercial plants that use the technology. Plans for the experimental plant were scratched.

Top Energy Department officials said the change [to another technology a few years from now] would save taxpayers money, generate more electricity and capture more than twice as much carbon dioxide.

But independent energy experts largely criticized the move, saying it would require two to four more years for new designs, plans and approvals, let alone budget tussles and eventual construction.

From the Toronto Star, Climate Neros fiddle while Rome burns:

How many radio or television debates have shown an environmentalist pointing out the devastating effects of oil sands and power production in Alberta, only to have industry officials tout concepts like “clean coal” or “carbon capture and sequestration” – as if the solution is here and the problem is being overcome as they speak?

The average listener is likely to walk away thinking that action is being taken and that there’s no need for concern. Problem is, we keep waiting and waiting and nothing really happens.

Professor David Keith, a chemical engineer and director of the University of Calgary’s energy and environmental systems group, warned at an oil sands conference last week that there’s tremendous uncertainty around the viability of these large projects. This reality, he pointed out, is overshadowed by all the hype.

“We’re not actually doing very much,” he said. “We’re in a world where there’s an enormous amount of talk but very little actual action.”

As Keith pointed out, there’s been no shortage of press releases. According to Emerging Energy Research of Cambridge, Mass., more than 20 major carbon-capture power generation projects were announced around the world last year – most of them proposed in Canada, the United States and Australia.

Not one, said Keith, is certain to move forward….

Keith, during his conference talk, said it’s one thing to capture carbon and another to store it. On the latter, he said there are just three large-scale projects underway worldwide and only in areas of the world where a carbon tax exists.

Oil companies and utilities are reluctant to move forward for several reasons. For one, there’s been a lack of clear policy direction in North America. Second, natural gas has stayed cheaper than expected so there’s been no urgency to lean on coal. Another major reason, cited by Keith, is that project costs are skyrocketing.

There’s a shortage of labour. Skilled workers and engineers are being lost to retirement faster than new workers are entering the market. The demand for resources, such as steel, continues to rise as countries such as China and other industries, such as nuclear, rush to lock up contracts.

“Nobody, to my knowledge, really knows whether this enormous run-up in capital costs is a bubble or not,” said Keith….

The largest carbon capture system in testing is about 2 megawatts – versus about 500 megawatts for a small coal plant. That has to be scaled up 250 times to prove it’s ready for prime time. Meanwhile, the largest underground storage project is injecting only 1 million tonnes of CO{-2} per year, compared to 6 million required for an average-size coal plant.

Let’s put this into perspective: in the U.S. alone there are nearly 1,500 coal-electricity generators in operation that are capable of providing all the power needs of Ontario 13 times over. More than 100 new plants are on the drawing board.

And China? What’s happening there is just plain scary. In 2006 alone, the Chinese added 100,000 megawatts of coal power to its grid – nearly four times all the power generation in Ontario. The rate of construction is expected to accelerate, not slow down.

A warming Earth (picture from NASA)

We need to increase research spending. Past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, John Holdren, was part of a research panel looking at current spending:

The White House points to what it says is spending of almost US$3 billion (€2.3 billion) a year on energy-technology research and development as its major contribution to combatting climate change. But Holdren said other calculations put spending at under $2 billion (€1.5 billion), and it’s “far from proportionate to either the size of the challenge or the size of the opportunities.”

Tuesday’s report [Confronting Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable] said such research budgets worldwide are badly underfunded, and require a tripling or quadrupling, to US$45 billion (€34.2 billion) or US$60 billion (€45.6 billion) a year.

Billions more should go toward work on cellulose as a biofuel, overcoming the problems of nuclear energy, reducing solar electricity’s cost, and developing other cleaner energy sources, Holdren said. He said intensified research is particularly needed for carbon capture and sequestration — technology to capture carbon dioxide in power-plant emissions and store it underground.

How much would a $10 billion dollar research tax cost if paid for only by electricity consumption? US electricity use was 4 million million kWh in 2006, so $10 billion would be 1/4 cent/kWh, presumably more for coal and natural gas kWh.

How much would a $10 billion dollar research tax cost if paid for only by gasoline consumption? In 2006, gasoline plus aviation gasoline plus kerosene-type jet fuel came to about 4 billion barrels in the US, about 160 billion gallons. So $10 billion would be a 6 cent tax/gallon.

It looks like we can afford to more than triple our research dollar. We certainly can’t afford not to.

Changing precipitation

In a lecture at UC, Berkeley, a spokeswoman from the UK showed graphs of either the UK or EU in 2050. Most of the electricity was from coal and natural gas with carbon capture and storage. The audience seemed to feel the proposal overdid it on CCS, but that it would be part of our future.

There may be several reasons to use CCS along with nuclear power. According to Carbon Capture And Its Storage: An Integrated Assessment by Simon Shackley and Clair Gough, the UK is building a demonstration project, collecting CO2 from a natural gas plant and injecting it into North Sea oil fields to increase the recovery. Indeed, the first use of CCS is for this purpose; timing is important because delay would lead to shutting down the wells and then making CO2 available.

Enhanced oil recovery

EOR produces more oil and more CO2. On the other hand, the more North Sea oil we use, the less tar shale we need. If the study confirms cost estimates and feasibility, this technology will be used to increase oil recovery elsewhere.

Nuclear power is the main competitor in the UK and elsewhere to reducing GHG emissions from electricity with CCS and either coal or natural gas.

How do the sources compare?

The company E.ON UK plc provided the following cost estimates for different generation options [today 1 British pound = $2].
Coal using CCS: 3.9 – 5.1 p/kWh
Nuclear: 2.5 – 4.0 p/kWh
Onshore wind: 4.2 – 5.2 p/kWh
Offshore wind: 6.2 – 8.4 p/kWh

Clearly wind and solar are not important energy resources in the UK.

Why might CCS be the better choice (sometimes)?
1. Construction and planning timescale: It should be possible to construct and operate a fossil fuel CCS in 4 to 6 years from the decision to proceed. This appears to be faster than nuclear though no one has built either a CCS plant or a modern nuclear plant. [Estimates of nuclear plant construction times come in at below 4 years to 6 years, eg, The Future of Nuclear Power.]

2. Modularity: with either coal or nuclear, the plant needs to be large for economy of scale. If gas is used, modular units of 350 MW can be used.

3. Capital costs: Transportation and storage costs will be substantial. These might decrease when 10 Mt/y CO2 are piped through the system, but this is more than one source would produce (a 1 GW coal plant produces 5 – 6 Mt/y).

Fossil CCS therefore demonstrates some of the limitations of nuclear with respect to ‘lumpiness’ [of investment] and inflexibility, but probably to a lesser extent than nuclear.

4. Fossil CCS plants may be cheaper than nuclear, if nuclear comes in at the high estimate and CCS at the low. [Plants with CCS don’t capture 10% or more of the CO2 emitted, and they need more energy and produce more CO2, so plants are expected to reduce GHG emissions only by 80-90%. That will increase the price of CCS plants if, as expected, GHG cap and trade or/and tax policies are implemented soon.]

5. It isn’t nuclear. Many in the UK public prefer “not nuclear” plants. Members of Parliament perceive opposition to nuclear power as greater than it actually is.

On the other hand, relying on natural gas as a fuel, an energy source where costs are volatile and an important part of the cost, is risky for society. [Uranium costs don’t have much effect on the cost of nuclear power.]

Other reasons I’ve heard:
• Put the energy eggs in as many baskets as possible.
• Anyone operating a relatively modern coal power plant a decade from now will be able to retrofit it for CCS. This will cost utilities dearly, but may be cheaper than dismantling a relatively new power plant.
• Biopower (using plants to make electricity) releases (ideally) just a little more CO2 than it absorbed from the atmosphere (more because you don’t walk it from the field to the plant). With CCS, most of the CO2 absorbed from the atmosphere would be stored, making biopwer potentially GHG negative.

According to Shackley and Hough, several questions still have to be answered about CCS viability:

• Is CCS viable from a geological perspective? Is there a strong and solid case for safe and secure long-term storage?

• What is the capacity for CO2 storage? It is important to narrow estimates for the ability of aquifer pores to store supercritical CO2 (temperature and pressure are above thermodynamic critical point), now ranging from 0 – 100%.

• What are the risks and potential impacts of leakage?

All sessions meet Mondays 5:30 – 7 PM at Berkeley Rep Theater.

• February 11 Jerry Tuskan Genomic Advances to Improve Biomass for Fuels

• March 10 Mary Ann Piette Saving Power at Peak Hours

• April 21 Joe Gray, Mina Bisselll, Mary Helen Barcellos-Hoff Genes and the Microenvironment: The Two Faces of Breast Cancer

• May 12 Nate Lewis Molecular Materials for Solar Energy

Waiting for spring

The Sacrament of Letting Go
by Macrina Wiedekehr

Slowly
she celebrated the sacrament of letting go.
First she surrendered her green,
then the orange, yellow, and red.
finally she let go of her own brown.
Shedding her last leaf
she stood empty and silent, stripped bare.
Leaning against the winter sky,
she began her vigil of trust.

They helped her to understand that
her vulnerability,
her dependence and need,
her emptiness, her readiness to receive,
were giving her a new kind of Beauty.
Every morning and every evening they stood in silence,
and celebrated together
the sacrament of waiting.

The sacrament of waiting. I began to celebrate this after I didn’t replace my only car.

There were many reasons: the cost, my need for regular exercise, how much harder it is to overschedule when carless. The environment was somewhere near the bottom of the list.

Only later did I begin to value time between events and locations.

A good introduction for Friends planning to attend the Friends General Conference gathering: Eco-Travel. Sign up now to get information about others from your area traveling by train, bus, or bike (from Philadelphia). Thanks to Linda for letting us know about this.

Do readers have stories about benefits they receive from slower travel by train or bus?

Recently someone sent an e-mail on the the climate change consequences of war. There may be more to worry about in the other direction: conflicts arising from climate change. From Center for Strategic & International Studies comes a new report, The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change.

Acknowledging that many estimates on the speed of change have proved too conservative, they extend the possibilities to three scenarios. These are their key findings:

• The expected climate change scenario considered in this report, with an average global temperature increase of 1.3°C by 2040, can be reasonably taken as a basis for national planning. As Podesta and Ogden write in Chapter III, the environmental effects in this scenario are “the least we ought to prepare for.” National security implications include: heightened internal and cross-border tensions caused by large-scale migrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, particularly in the weak and failing states of Africa; increased disease proliferation, which will have economic consequences; and some geopolitical reordering as nations adjust to shifts in resources and prevalence of disease. Across the board, the ways in which societies react to climate change will refract through underlying social, political, and economic factors.

• In the case of severe climate change, corresponding to an average increase in global temperature of 2.6°C by 2040, massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, addressed in Chapter IV, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos. In this scenario, climate change provokes a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature.

• The catastrophic scenario, with average global temperatures increasing by 5.6°C by 2100, finds strong and surprising intersections between the two great security threats of the day— global climate change and international terrorism waged by Islamist extremists. This catastrophic scenario would pose almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggled to adapt. It is by far the most difficult future to visualize without straining credulity. The scenario notes that understanding climate change in light of the other great threat of our age, terrorism, can be illuminating. Although distinct in nature, both threats are linked to energy use in the industrialized world, and, indeed, the solutions to both depend on transforming the world’s energy economy—America’s energy economy in particular. The security community must come to grips with these linkages, because dealing with only one of these threats in isolation is likely to exacerbate the other, while dealing with them together can provide important synergies.

• Historical comparisons from previous civilizations and national experiences of such natural phenomena as floods, earthquakes, and disease may be of help in understanding how societies will deal with unchecked climate change. In the past, natural disasters generally have been either localized, abrupt, or both, making it difficult to directly compare the worldwide effects of prolonged climate change to historical case studies. No precedent exists for a disaster of this magnitude—one that affects entire civilizations in multiple ways simultaneously. Nonetheless, the historical record can be instructive; human beings have reacted to crisis in fairly consistent ways. Natural disasters have tended to be divisive and sometimes unifying, provoke social and even international conflict, inflame religious turbulence, focus anger against migrants or minorities, and direct wrath toward governments for their actions or inaction. People have reacted with strategies of resistance and resilience—from flood control to simply moving away. Droughts and epidemic disease have generally exacted the heaviest toll—both in demographic and economic terms—and both are expected effects of future climate change. Indeed, even though global warming is unprecedented, many of its effects will be experienced as local and regional phenomena, suggesting that past human behavior may well be predictive of the future.

• Poor and underdeveloped areas are likely to have fewer resources and less stamina to deal with climate change —in even its very modest and early manifestations. The impact on rainfall, desertification, pestilence, and storm intensity has already been felt in much of Africa, parts of Central Asia, and throughout Central and South America. Some of the nations and people of these regions lack the resilience to deal with modest—let alone profound—disturbances to local conditions. In contrast, wealthier societies have more resources, incentives, and capabilities to deploy, to offset, or to mitigate at least some of the more modest consequences of climate change. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that climate change will not be a problem for affluent countries, including the United States. Such nations may also face dire conditions such as permanent agricultural disruptions, endemic disease, ferocious storm patterns, deep droughts, the disappearance of vast tracks of coastal land, and the collapse of ocean fisheries, which could well trigger a profound loss of confidence in the most advanced and richest states.

• Perhaps the most worrisome problems associated with rising temperatures and sea levels are from large-scale migrations of people — both inside nations and across existing national borders. In all three scenarios it was projected that rising sea levels in Central America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and the associated disappearance of low lying coastal lands could conceivably lead to massive migrations—potentially involving hundreds of millions of people. These dramatic movements of people and the possible disruptions involved could easily trigger major security concerns and spike regional tensions. In some scenarios, the number of people forced to move in the coming decades could dwarf previous historical migrations. The more severe scenarios suggest the prospect of perhaps billions of people over the medium or longer term being forced to relocate. The possibility of such a significant portion of humanity on the move, forced to relocate, poses an enormous challenge even if played out over the course of decades.

• The term “global climate change” is misleading in that many of the effects will vary dramatically from region to region. Changes in ocean currents, atmospheric conditions, and cumulative rainfall will vary across different geographies, making it difficult to predict truly global outcomes. Most localities will likely experience rising temperatures, but some places might see temperature declines due to the complexities of local climate processes. Changes across the board are unlikely to be gradual and predictable and more likely to be uneven and abrupt. Certain ecosystems—such as polar ice regions and tropical rainforests—are much more susceptible to even modest changes in local temperatures. And these regions are particularly important when it comes to both regulating and triggering conditions associated with climate change. Global climate change involves the entire planet but it will play out very differently with varying levels of intensity and significance in different regions—a key observation of the group.

• A few countries may benefit from climate change in the short term, but there will be no “winners.” Any location on Earth is potentially vulnerable to the cascading and reinforcing negative effects of global climate change. While growing seasons might lengthen in some areas, or frozen seaways might open to new maritime traffic in others, the negative offsetting consequences—such as a collapse of ocean systems and their fisheries—could easily negate any perceived local or national advantages. Unchecked global climate change will disrupt a dynamic ecological equilibrium in ways that are difficult to predict. The new ecosystem is likely to be unstable and in continual flux for decades or longer. Today’s “winner” could be tomorrow’s big-time loser.

• Climate change effects will aggravate existing international crises and problems. Although a shared sense of threat can in some cases promote national innovation and reform as well as induce cooperation among governments, the scenario authors found that climate change is likely to worsen existing tensions, especially over natural resources, and possibly lead to conflict. Indeed, this magnifying of existing problems by climate change is already taking place, from desertification in Darfur, to water shortages in the Middle East, to disruptions of monsoons in South Asia and attendant struggles over land and water use. These and other effects are likely to increase and intensify in the years ahead.

• We lack rigorously tested data or reliable modeling to determine with any sense of certainty the ultimate path and pace of temperature increase or sea level rise associated with climate change in the decades ahead. Our group found that, generally speaking, most scientific predictions in the overall arena of climate change over the last two decades, when compared with ultimate outcomes, have been consistently below what has actually transpired. There are perhaps many reasons for this tendency—an innate scientific caution, an incomplete data set, a tendency for scientists to steer away from controversy, persistent efforts by some to discredit climate “alarmists,” to name but a few—but the result has been a relatively consistent underestimation of the increase in global climate and ice melting. This tendency should provide some context when examining current predictions of future climate parameters.

• Any future international agreement to limit carbon emissions will have considerable geopolitical as well as economic consequences. For instance, China’s role in such an arrangement could significantly affect the international community’s perception of its willingness and capacity to serve as a “responsible stakeholder.” The added strategic significance of low-carbon fuels in a carbon-constrained world, meanwhile, could bolster the position of a natural gas-rich country such as Russia. Such a new correlation of energy related power might conceivably lead to a diminished role and significance of the Middle East in global politics. In addition, major proliferation challenges would ensue from a vast expansion in the use of nuclear power. The emergence of alternative energy sources, especially biofuels, could also create new regions of strategic significance.

• The scale of the potential consequences associated with climate change —particularly in more dire and distant scenarios —made it difficult to grasp the extent and magnitude of the possible changes ahead. Even among our creative and determined group of seasoned observers, it was extraordinarily challenging to contemplate revolutionary global change of this magnitude. Global temperature increases of more than 3°C and sea level rises measured in meters (a potential future examined in scenario three) pose such a dramatically new global paradigm that it is virtually impossible to contemplate all the aspects of national and international life that would be inevitably affected. As one participant noted, “unchecked climate change equals the world depicted by Mad Max, only hotter, with no beaches, and perhaps with even more chaos.” While such a characterization may seem extreme, a careful and thorough examination of all the many potential consequences associated with global climate change is profoundly disquieting. The collapse and chaos associated with extreme climate change futures would destabilize virtually every aspect of modern life. The only comparable experience for many in the group was considering what the aftermath of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange might have entailed during the height of the Cold War.

• At a definitional level, a narrow interpretation of the term “national security” may be woefully inadequate to convey the ways in which state authorities might break down in a worst case climate change scenario. It is clearly the case that dramatic migrations and movements of people (among other worrisome effects) will trigger deep insecurity in some communities, but it is far from clear whether these anxieties will trigger a traditional national security response. It is conceivable that under certain scenarios a well-armed nation experiencing the ravages of environmental effects brought on by climate change might covet the more mild and fertile territory of another country and contemplate seizing that land by force. While this kind of scenario should not be ignored, there is a broader and more likely range of potential problems, including disease, uncontrolled migration, and crop failure, that are more likely to overwhelm the traditional instruments of national security (the military in particular) and other elements of state power and authority rather than cause them to be used in the manner described above.

In the course of writing this study we found inescapable, overriding conclusions. In the coming decade the United States faces an ominous set of challenges for this and the next generation of foreign policy and national security practitioners. These include reversing the decline in America’s global standing, rebuilding the nation’s armed forces, finding a responsible way out from Iraq while maintaining American influence in the wider region, persevering in Afghanistan, working toward greater energy security, re-conceptualizing the struggle against violent extremists, restoring public trust in all manner of government functions, preparing to cope with either naturally occurring or manmade pathogens, and quelling the fear that threatens to cripple our foreign policy—just to name a few. Regrettably, to this already daunting list we absolutely must add dealing responsibly with global climate change. Our group found that, left unaddressed, climate change may come to represent as great or a greater foreign policy and national security challenge than any problem from the preceding list. And, almost certainly, overarching global climate change will complicate many of these other issues.

This report makes clear that we are already living in an age of consequences when it comes to climate change and its impact on national security, both broadly and narrowly defined. The overall experience of these working groups helped underscore how much needs to be done on a sustained basis in this emerging field of exploration. While more work clearly needs to be done on the overall science of carbon loading and its impact on climate change, we already know enough to appreciate that the cascading consequences of unchecked climate change are to include a range of security problems that will have dire global consequences. This study aims to illuminate how some of these security concerns might manifest themselves in a future warming—and worrisome—world.

earth cracked due to heat and drought

Traveling for the holidays and want to offset an airplane trip? I was asked about this recently: first, how much, and second with what organization. Unfortunately, it seems to me that many of the offset organizations I looked at have been under attack for not assuring additionality (my offset funds buys greenhouse gas reductions in addition to what would have happened without my help), etc, etc.

Atmosfair calculates your greenhouse gas emissions for flying. They supplement time at high altitudes to account for the greater effects of water vapor, etc at that altitude, and supplement short trips to account for the relatively high percentage of time spent in takeoff or landing.

I tried two examples, both from my area, multiplying kg by 2.2 to get pounds:

SF – London with a layover in NYC 5,780 kg = 12,700 pounds carbon dioxide equivalent
SF – LA 380 kg = 840 pounds CO2e

SF to NYC to London is 12,000 miles round trip, so this trip comes in at just over a pound CO2e/mile. SF to LAX is 675 miles RT, or about 1 1/4 pound CO2e/mile.

What can I do to offset this?
One possibility is replacing incandescent bulbs with compact fluorescent. Soon, we all will, but in the meantime, you can donate bulbs to the local food bank, the one getting bags of food every few months to locals for whom the food dollar doesn’t always make it to the end of the month.

Other possibilities?

So how many bulbs do I need to give away?
Go to EPA to find out how much greenhouse gas 1 kWh produces in your area. Just enter your zip code, and verify your utility. The first chart gives the mix of energy sources in your area, the second one the number of pounds of carbon dioxide equivalent for each 1,000 kWh you use. (1 MWh = 1,000 kWh)

Let’s assume that all of the offset will come from 75W equivalent bulbs. These last longer than incandescents, and will more than pay for themselves during their lifetime in cheaper energy use, as they use about 1/4 as much electricity. You’re going to give away bulbs to people who haven’t yet bought them.

Assume the 75W equivalent bulb last 8,000 hours, yes, the package says more, my local hardware store says 8,000 hours. Over that time, the bulb will reduce emissions by
3/4 * 0.075 kW * 8,000 hr = 450 kWh

Now multiply the number of kWh by the local GHG/kWh, for example, if you live in California, a 75W equivalent compact fluorescent displaces
450 kWh * 879 pounds CO2e/1,000 kWh = 400 pounds CO2e

If you live in the Twin Cities, a 75W equivalent compact fluorescent displaces
450 kWh * 1,814 pounds CO2e/1,000 kWh = 820 pounds CO2e

Now divide GHG emissions from flying by GHG emissions/bulb to get the appropriate number of bulbs to give away:
12,700 pounds CO2e/(400 pounds CO2e/bulb) = 30 bulbs in CA
or
12,700 pounds CO2e/(820 pounds CO2e/bulb) = 16 bulbs in MN

Yes, it’s cheaper for people in MN to offset flying, but it’s cheaper for people in CA to offset their electricity use. More on this is January.

American cars will get a needed boost in fuel economy, but they may not have the size, speed, and acceleration that many Americans consider important, according to Energy Outlook’s Rethinking Fuel Economy.

What about designing cars for someone without those expectations? It turns out that the Vehicle Design Summit is on the job, planning for India.

Indian traffic jams are more common high population to street ratios in Indian cities.

Designing transportation systems for India and much of the rest of Asia requires more than supplying better cars. Europe has a better bus system in part to protect the fragile inner city. This is even more of a problem in Asia, where the infrastructure does not allow American levels of car use. Hypermotorization, it’s called, and it’s one of Lee Schipper’s projects at EMBARQ. What’s true for Asians is also true for us: the imminent increase in fuel economy is only a part of the solution.

On a related topic, Virginia and David Lockett moved to Vietnam to help motorcycle accident victims, who often suffer brain injuries because they ride without helmets. Their site, Steady Footsteps, talks about their experience. Today, helmets are compulsory there.

I feel uncomfortable shifting to solutions discussed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change synthesis summary report without spending some time with what comes up for me when considering the changes to the world we live in, changes that will occur in my lifetime possibly, certainly in the lifetime of people I know.

I choose two predictions to look at in a little more detail.

In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in a region already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, hydropower potential, summer tourism and, in general, crop productivity.

NASA posted on this:

“There is some evidence that rainfall patterns already may be changing,” [Drew] Shindell added. “Much of the Mediterranean area, North Africa and the Middle East rapidly are becoming drier. If the trend continues as expected, the consequences may be severe in only a couple of decades. These changes could pose significant water resource challenges to large segments of the population.”

On RealClimate, a professor posted about going for a vacation on the Med:

The 10-hour flight from Chicago to Istanbul often inspires passengers to romanticize about Istanbul, both tourists and natives alike. Istanbul is the city of legends, forests, and the Bosphorus. It is an open museum of millennia of history with archeological and cultural remnants surrounded by green lush gardens. It is the place where east meets west; where blue meets green; where the great Mevlâna’s inviting words whisper in the wind “Come, come again, whoever you are, come!”

So you can imagine our collective horror as the plane started circling Istanbul and we saw a dry, desolate, dusty city without even a hint of green anywhere.

Temperatures reached 46 C (115 F) this year, and Turkish farmers lost billions of dollars in crops.

Tuz Golu lost half its water volume in recent decades.

The North Atlantic Oscillation appears to have moved into a positive phase:

a low pressure system prevails over Iceland and a high pressure system over the Azores. This causes cooler northern seas, stronger winter storms across the Atlantic Ocean, warm wet winters in northern Europe, and cold and dry winters in Canada and Greenland. However, this also causes less rain and reduced stream flow in southeastern Europe and the Middle East. In general, when NAO is in a positive phase, the Mediterranean region receives less precipitation.

Not mentioned are changes expected in my neck of the woods:

Precipitation changes (Science subscription needed)

If these models are correct, the levels of aridity of the recent multiyear drought or the Dust Bowl and the 1950s droughts will become the new climatology of the American Southwest within a time frame of years to decades.

The authors define American Southwest as land areas of the US and Mexico between 125°W and 95°W and 25°N and 40°N. San Francisco is near the northern end at 38°N, and San Diego at 33°N is in the middle. Dust bowl conditions refer to 0.09 mm/day, just over 1 inch/year.

Dust bowl conditions in the US Midwest in the 1930s arose with a cool tropical Pacific. See here for more information and animations on that time.

Meanwhile in Latin America, according to the IPCC report:

By mid century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced by arid-land vegetation.

Manu Cloud Forest in Peru

scarlet macaw

Tapirs are gone or threatened in some areas but in Amazonia, they are only under pressure.

A Science Express article, Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon, depicts a likely decrease in precipitation during the dry season, combined with increased temperatures and evaporation, producing a seasonal water deficit. This water deficit will be exacerbated by the loss of forest along with their contribution to rain.

The forest biome of Amazonia is one of Earth’s greatest biological treasures, and a major component of the Earth system. This century, it faces the dual threats of deforestation and stress from climate change.

So how do we feel about this?
I hope to hear from readers.

When I posted on IPCC’s list of changes, my eyes glazed over. At some point, I stopped reading. I didn’t want to read more.

I struggled to describe what it means to me. At times this has been easy for me, but today it is not. I intended originally to remember for this post what I have felt in the past, but decided against it.

I feel like just one of many Hans Brinkers.

Meanwhile the tsunami, barely visible, is about to break.

tsunami in deep water — the signs where I live are subtle, but the waves will break soon.

While I intend to continue posting on science and policy issues, I will try an experiment, occasional posts on

• the feelings that come up for me when I read about the science, or
• consider changes in my own life,
• what motivates me to act for the environment in how I live and the work, and
• the long-term benefits I see in myself from changes originally made for the environment.

I saw myself reading the what is likely to go wrong portion of the IPCC Synthesis Report in the eyes-glazed-over, skim-for-the-occasional-detail mode. Unlike policy options, these kinds of posts get few comments, possibly because others are reading or avoiding reading in the same way I did this time. In a previous post, Friends, our Integrity Testimony, and climate change, I asked Friends and others to consider where we get our information, to reach agreement intellectually on the parameters for the discussion.

Now I want to post occasionally on the emotional aspects. We share common emotional reactions to what is happening, and to the prospect of changing ourselves. We do not share in the same proportion grief, joy, resentment, acquiescence. But we do share these feelings and others. I am interested in hearing from you.

My next post will be on my reaction to the IPCC Summary report. Or lack of reaction.

joy

more joy

Symphony of Grief

I’m currently reading Gwyneth Cravens’ Power to Save the World, will blog on it in early January. I decided to post this after a friend described scientists as people who…. His description did not fit the scientists I know.

The epigraph:

Most of us were taught that the goal of science is power over nature, as if science and power were one thing and nature quite another. Niels Bohr observed to the contrary that the more modest but relentless goal of science is, in his words, “the gradual removal of prejudices.” By “prejudice,” Bohr meant belief unsupported by evidence. Richard Rhodes

Early in the book, Cravens describes beliefs that she later decided were prejudices. The remainder of the book describes her process of change.

When I turned to the statements of antinuclear groups, I naturally found that they echoed many of my own assumptions; that uranium mining and processing, depleted uranium, nuclear accidents and nuclear waste had killed or would one day kill huge numbers of people, caused mutations and birth defects, and turned pristine places, usually home of Native Americans, into radioactive wastelands; that all man-made radioactive material was lethal and we lacked any natural defenses against it; that all radiation was bad; that cancer clusters occurred around nuclear facilities; that to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons all reactors had to be shut down; that terrorists could easily overwhelm a nuclear plant or waste dump; that such facilities could explode atomically; that there was no safe place to put our towering heaps of nuclear waste, which would remain harmful for millions of years; that reliance on uranium was futile because soon we’d be running out of it, just as were running out of oil, that nuclear power put almost as much carbon into the environment as coal, gas, and oil; and that instead of using fossil fuels and nuclear power we could instead practice conservation and obtain all our energy from wind, sunlight, tides, and geysers.

The fall meeting has begun. Some presentations will be webcast, notably Lonnie Thompson’s talk Wednesday at 6:15 PM, Abrupt Climate Change and Our Future.

Update: Also see the Nature blog on the conference.

RealClimate is blogging on this. Their first dispatch includes the following:

• Greenland experienced an earlier glacier retreat comparable to today’s about 1,000 – 1,200 years ago, so locally temperatures were as warm then as they are today. (This was only locally true.)

• Most glaciers are melting faster. The sea has warmed 4 C over the past 15 year. This change in outlet glaciers increases flow. Melt ponds are now ubiquitous.

melt ponds

Leigh Stearns and collaborators point out that the Greenland Ice Sheet’s contribution to sea level has doubled in the past five years, due largely to factors connected with ice dynamics (and not incorporated in the IPCC estimates). They showed satellite data which indicates that just two glaciers — Helheim and Kangerdlugssuaq — might account for 10% of this increase. Ominously, more glaciers are primed to pop as climate continues to warm. About the increased flow speeds in this region, they suggest the system has entered a new state: “We speculate that these faster flow speeds represent a new long-term state of behavior which, while not as dramatic as the short-lived periods of peak speeds, have important implications for the rate of sea level rise.”

measuring glacier flow

• Bush’s science advisor John Marburger also provoked fear in the audience, because he advocated against greenhouse gas mitigation.

Friend Tom Yamaguchi has changed his opinion of nuclear power. His letter to Bonnie Raitt explains the details.

I just read the Summary for Policymakers to see what is new and different. All of statements below are direct quotes. I will post portions of the mitigation section later.

There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. Mediterranean basin, western United States, southern Africa and northeast Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change.

Hundreds of millions of people exposed to increased water stress [on figure SPM.7, for any temperature increase over 1998]

Up to 30% of species at increasing risk of extinction [same figure, at a temperature increase of 1.5 – 3 C+], significant extinction (40-70% of species assessed) around the globe [at 3.5 C+]

Terrestrial biosphere tends toward a net carbon source, 15% of ecosystems affected [at around 2.4 C]

Examples of some projected regional impacts [unless stated otherwise, confidence is high or very high]

Africa:
• By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change;
• By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This would further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition;
• Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea-level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with large populations. The cost of adaptation could amount to at least 5-10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
• By 2080, an increase of 5-8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a range of climate scenarios.

Asia:
• By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-EastAsia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to decrease;
• Coastal areas, especially heavily-populated megadelta regions in South, East and South-East Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some megadeltas, flooding from the rivers;
• Climate change is projected to compound the pressures on natural resources and the environment, associated with rapid urbanization, industrialization and economic development;
• Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease primarily associated with floods and droughts are expected to rise in East, South and South-East Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle.

Australia and New Zealand:
• By 2020, significant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur in some ecologically rich sites including the Great Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics;
• By 2030, water security problems are projected to intensify in southern and eastern Australia and, in New Zealand, in Northland and some eastern regions;
• By 2030, production from agriculture and forestry is projected to decline over much of southern and eastern Australia, and over parts of eastern New Zealand, due to increased drought and fire. However, in New Zealand, initial benefits are projected in some other regions.;
• By 2050, ongoing coastal development and population growth in some areas of Australia and New Zealand are projected to exacerbate risks from sea level rise and increases in the severity and frequency of storms and coastal flooding.

Europe:
• Climate change is expected to magnify regional differences in Europe’s natural resources and assets. Negative impacts will include increased risk of inland flash floods, and more frequent coastal flooding and increased erosion (due to storminess and sea-level rise);
• Mountainous areas will face glacier retreat, reduced snow cover and winter tourism, and extensive species losses (in some areas up to 60% under high emissions scenarios by 2080);
• In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in a region already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, hydropower potential, summer tourism and, in general, crop productivity;
• Climate change is also projected to increase the health risks due to heat-waves, and the frequency of wildfires.

Latin America:
• By mid century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced by arid-land vegetation.
• There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America;
• Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with adverse consequences for food security. In temperate zones soybean yields are projected to increase. Overall, the number of people at risk of hunger is projected to increase (TS; medium confidence).
• Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation.

North America:
• Warming in western mountains is projected to cause decreased snowpack, more winter flooding, and reduced summer flows, exacerbating competition for over-allocated water resources;
• In the early decades of the century, moderate climate change is projected to increase aggregate yields of rain-fed agriculture by 5-20%, but with important variability among regions. Major challenges are projected for crops that are near the warm end of their suitable range or which depend on highly utilized water resources;
• During the course of this century, cities that currently experience heatwaves are expected to be further challenged by an increased number, intensity and duration of heatwaves during the course of the century, with potential for adverse health impacts;
• Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts interacting with development and pollution.

Polar Regions:
• The main projected biophysical effects are reductions in thickness and extent of glaciers and ice sheets and sea ice, and changes in natural ecosystems with detrimental effects on many organisms including migratory birds, mammals and higher predators;
• For human communities in the Arctic, impacts, particularly those resulting from changing snow and ice conditions are projected to be mixed;
• Detrimental impacts would include those on infrastructure and traditional indigenous ways of life;
• In both polar regions, specific ecosystems and habitats are projected to be vulnerable, as climatic barriers to species invasions are lowered.

Small Islands:
• Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island communities;
• Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of beaches and coral bleaching is expected to affect local resources;
• By mid-century, climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands, e.g., in the Caribbean and Pacific, to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand during low-rainfall periods.
• With higher temperatures, increased invasion by non-native species is expected to occur, particularly on mid- and high-latitude islands.

[L]ikely to be especially affected by climate change

Systems and sectors:
• particular ecosystems:
• terrestrial: tundra, boreal forest and mountain regions because of sensitivity to warming; mediterranean-type ecosystems because of reduction in rainfall; and tropical rainforests where precipitation declines
• coastal: mangroves and salt marshes, due to multiple stresses
• marine: coral reefs due to multiple stresses; the sea ice biome because of sensitivity to warming
• water resources in some dry regions at mid-latitudes13 and in the dry tropics, due to changes in rainfall and evapotranspiration, and in areas dependent on snow and ice melt
• agriculture in low-latitudes , due to reduced water availability
• low-lying coastal systems, due to threat of sea level rise and increased risk from extreme weather events
• human health in populations with low adaptive capacity.

Regions:
• the Arctic, because of the impacts of high rates of projected warming on natural systems and human communities
• Africa, because of low adaptive capacity and projected climate change impacts
• small islands, where there is high exposure of population and infrastructure to projected climate change impacts
• Asian and African megadeltas, due to large populations and high exposure to sea level rise, storm surges and river flooding.

One more comment from the InterAcademy Council report Lighting the Way: Toward a Sustainable Energy Future, because there was so much discussion of the nuclear portion.

In the case of nuclear power it is fair to say that understanding of the technology and of the potential developments that could mitigate some of the concerns reviewed above—both among the public and among policymakers—is dated. A transparent and scientifically driven re-examination of the issues surrounding nuclear power and their potential solutions is needed.

Perhaps politicians would be willing to put their anti-nuclear power decisions on hold while we wait for this report?

Today’s NY Times has a graphic, comparing costs of various sources of electricity with and without a greenhouse gas tax (the tax could be a direct tax or the result of a cap and trade policy):

For larger image

I’m not sure what long-term expectations are about natural gas prices. A DOE graph shows natural gas oscillating between $6 and $8/million BTU this year, but natural gas ranged from $10 – 12 for several months in 2005.

With a $10/ton CO2 tax (again, this could be the result of a cap and trade policy), nuclear power is cheaper than all but natural gas, assuming $6/million BTU. Pulverized coal is a tad more expensive than nuclear, and gasified coal is 1 cent/kWh more expensive, as is natural gas with higher costs. Wind, biomass, and solar thermal are 3 – 6 cent/kWh more expensive (lowest estimate for solar thermal).

At $50/ton CO2 tax, coal is more costly than wind. By the time the tax reaches this level, the costs of solar thermal hopefully have fallen below coal’s cost in southern states, though today solar thermal could not compete.